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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE LEGISLATIVE VETO
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive- and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the
different legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the
course of practice, which prove the obscurity which reigns in
these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political
science.1
Although far from the constitutionally formative era in which
James Madison penned these words, modern courts still grapple
with the constitutional questions raised in delineations of governmental powers. Preserving the division of powers within the federal structure requires flexibility to accommodate changing conditions,2 but also rigidity to maintain the integrity of the individual
branches.3 Legislative vetoes present the most recent challenge to
this constitutional balance between pragmatism and theory. A legislative veto is a statutory rider to a delegation of administrative
authority that reserves to Congress the power to void an admmistrative decision by various means that fall short of the normal statutory amendment process of passage by both houses of Congress
and presidential approval.4 The types of legislative veto 5 include:
congressional disapproval by a one-huuse vote;6 approval by a onehouse vote;7 disapproval by a concurrent resolution of both
houses; s approval by a concurrent resolution of both houses;9 dis1. THE FEDERALIST No. 37 (J. Madison) at 229 (Modern Library College ed. 1937).
2. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
3. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison), supra note 1, at 338.
4. See J. HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADmmSTRATION 204 (1964).
5. For a partial compilation of legislative veto provisions see Comment, Congress Steps
Out: A Look at CongressionalControl of the Executive, 63 CAL. L. REv. 983, 1089-94 apps.
A & B (1975) [hereinafter cited as Congress Steps Out].
6. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 9009(c), 9039(c) (1976) (providing congressional review of proposed regulations by the Federal Election Commission).
7. This provision has never been employed. J. BOLTON, THE LEGSLATE VErO 2 n.6
(1977).
8. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1981(a)(2) (1976) (disapproval of a presidential rejection of a
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approval or approval by committee action; 0 and selective veto, approving part and disapproving part of the administrative action."2
In Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS),'
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held unconstitutional a one-house disapproval provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1967 (INA). 13 Recently, legislative vetoes have been challenged on constitutional grounds, but
prior to Chadha only one court had reached the merits of the issue.14 In Atkins v. United States, 5 the Court of Claims held a leg-

tariff duty hike).
9. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 104(b)(5) (Supp. III 1979) (approval of funds for the federal interstate highway system).
10. See, e.g., Post Office Department Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 91-422, 84 Stat. 876
(1970) (appropriation not renewed) (approval by the House and Senate Committees on Public Works of funds for new postal facilities).
11. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 359 (Supp. III 1979) (permitting one house of Congress to allow
some proposed pay increases while prohibiting other increases).
12. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980).
13. The INA provides:
In the case of an alien [whose deportation proceedings have been suspended by
either the Senate or the House of Representatives
the Attorney General] if
passes a resolution stating in substance that it does not favor the suspension of
such deportation, the Attorney General shall thereupon deport such alien or
authorize the alien's voluntary departure at his own expense under the order of
neither the Senate nor the
deportation in the manner provided by law. If
House of Representatives shall pass such a resolution, the Attorney General
shall cancel deportation proceedings.
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2) (1976).
14. Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (en banc), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978). Legislative veto cases in which the merits were not reached
include: Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (law found unconstitutional on other grounds);
Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiain) (en banc), afl'd sub noma., Clark v.
Kimmitt, 431 U.S. 950 (1977) (lack of ripeness); Citronelle-Mobile Gathering, Inc. v. Gulf
Oil Corp., 420 F Supp. 162 (S.D. Ala. 1976), remanded, 578 F.2d 1149 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 879 (1979) (lack of standing). Two dissenting opinions, however, have addressed the merits of the constitutionality of the legislative veto. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. at 283-86 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (would hold veto provision constitutional); Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d at 685-90 (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) (would
hold veto unconstitutional). Some suggest that by allowing Congress to require that rules
proposed by the Supreme Court be laid before Congress for possible disapproval by statute,
the Court in Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 (1941), affirmed the use of legislative vetoes.
Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d at 1060 & n.21. The Court in Sibbach, however, merely
reaffirmed the principle that Congress may regulate the practice and procedure of the federal courts by the complete statutory process. 312 U.S. at 9-10. Therefore, the Court did not
address the question of the constitutional validity of congressional control by something less
than that procedure.
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islative veto provision constitutional. Thus, the court in Chadha
seemingly disagreed with the court in Atkins. This Comment will
examine the court's reasoning m Chadha,distinguish the results of
Chadha and Atkins, and propose a rule to determine generally the
constitutionality of legislative veto provisions.
THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING LEGISLATIVE VETOES

The issue of the constitutionality of the legislative veto has been
argued extensively in academic circles. 16 Supporters of the legislative veto contend that the broad congressional power granted in
the necessary and proper clause of the United States Constitution"' warrants its use."' This power allows extensive legislative action as long as the action is directed toward a legitimate constitutional end.19 Pursuant to the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations 20 and the power to regulate naturalization, 21 Congress has plenary control over the admission and deportation of
aliens.22 Thus, proponents argue that any procedure enacted by
Congress to regulate naturalization or commerce with foreign nations is valid. Proponents also argue that any original legislation
containing a veto provision was passed by both houses and was
subject to presidential veto, thereby satisfying the constitutional
requirements of bicameral passage 23 and presentation to the Presi15. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977) (per curiam) (en banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009
(1978).
16. See generally Henry, The Legislative Veto: In Search of ConstitutionalLimits, 16
HARv. J. LEGIS. 735 (1979); Miller & Knapp, The Congressional Veto: Preserving the ConstitutionalFramework, 52 IND. L.J. 367 (1977); Congress Steps Out, supra note 5.
17. The necessary and proper clause vests Congress with the power "[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the Foregoing Powers, and
all other Powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
18. See 556 F.2d at 1061.
19. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. Id. cl. 4.
22. See Klemdienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
23. Bicameralism is the division of a legislative body into two chambers. BLACK's LAW
DICTIONARY 147 (5th ed. 1979). Because the Constitution demands that passage of a law be
by both chambers of Congress, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, this Comment uses "bicameralism" to mean the requisite agreement of both houses of Congress.
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dent for possible veto.24 Finally, proponents maintain that many
actions of Congress are exempt from bicameralism, 25 so the bicameral requirement should be construed liberally when considering
the legislative veto.26
Opponents of the legislative veto cite numerous constitutional
failings of the provisions. First, they argue that the veto violates

the presentation for veto requirement of the Constitution2= by al-

lowing action with the force of law to take effect without submitting it to the President.28 Second, by superseding administrative
decisions without using the typical statutory amendment process,
the legislative veto prevents the President from executing the
laws. 29 Third, the one-house veto violates the bicameral requirement by allowing action with the force of law to take effect by a
vote of only one house.30 Finally, the legislative veto unconstitutionally 3 delegates to Congress authority it could not otherwise
assume. '
Augmenting the constitutional arguments are the pragmatic policy considerations of daily governmental operations. In recent
years the control of administrative agencies that have been dele32
gated broad regulatory powers has grown increasingly difficult.

These agencies issue regulations faster than Congress can use the
statutory amendment process to correct abuses of regulatory authority3 3 The legislative veto therefore insures prompt Congressional supervision of the delegation of power 4 and increases con24. 556 F.2d at 1065. The presentation for veto requirement demands that "[e]very Order, Resolution, or Vote" passed by both houses, except adjournments, be submitted to the
president for possible veto, and if vetoed, the bill may be enacted as law only by repassage
by a two-thirds vote of both houses. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 3.
25. The Constitution, for example, grants individual authority for impeachments to the
Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
26. 556 F.2d at 1062.
27. See note 24 supra.

28. J. BOLTON, supra note 7, at 31.
29. Id. The Constitution requires that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be
" U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
faithfully executed
30. See Henry, supra note 16, at 735, 741.
31. Id.
32. See SENATE CommrrraE ON GOVER NENT AFFAiRS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SEss., 2 STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATIONS 116 (Comm. Print 1977).

33. Id.
34. Id. at 117.
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Serious problems, however, accompany the perceived benefits of
the veto. The veto delays finality m the regulatory process and creates uncertainty in regulated industries.3 " Legislative veto also invites special interest groups to pressure Congress to remove burdensome regulations37 and encourages agencies to transfer
decisionmaking from the rulemaking process to the adjudicatory
process, which increases delay in the regulatory process. 8 Finally,
by forcing constant review of administrative action, the legislative
veto increases the workload of Congress while it decreases the likelihood of alternate solutions to the regulatory problem, such as improved drafting of laws.39
CHADHA V. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE

Jagdish Rai Chadha entered the United States as a non-immigrant student in 1966.40 Chadha's visa expired in 1972, and in 1974
the INS initiated deportation proceedings against him.41 Pursuant
to a provision in the INA that authorized suspension of a deportation order when the deportation would cause the alien severe hardship,42 the INS suspended Chadha's deportation.43 The INS then
reported the suspension order to Congress pursuant to section
244(c) of the INA, which allowed disapproval of such a suspension
by a resolution of one house of Congress." On December 16, 1975,
the House of Representatives passed House Resolution 926, which
35. Id.
36. Id. at 118-19.
37. Id. at 119.
38. Id. Because the adjudicatory process must adhere to more rigid due process requirements than the rulemaking process, an adjudicatory process usually takes longer to complete than a rulemaking process.
39. Id. at 120-22.
40. Chadha v. Immigration & Nat. Serv., 634 F.2d at 411.
41. Id.
42. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1976).
43. 634 F.2d at 411. When deportation proceedings are suspended, the Attorney General,
in his discretion, may "adjust the status [of the alien] to that of an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence." Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
(1976).
44. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976).
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disapproved the suspension of Chadha's deportation order.4 5 After
the INS ordered Chadha's deportation, 4 he appealed unsuccessfully to the Board of Immigration Appeals. 47 He then petitioned
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, contending that the
legislative veto provision of the INA, section 244(c)(2), unconstitutionally violated the separation of powers doctrine.48
Before determining the constitutionality of the legislative veto
provision of the INA, the court in Chadha reviewed the INS's procedure for suspending deportation orders. 49 The court found that
to qualify for a suspension the alien must satisfy explicit statutory
prerequisites, including a seven-year residency and good moral behavior.5 0 The alien then must obtain the approval of the Attorney
General. 51 The court concluded that section 244 of the INA established criteria that applied in an "individual adjudicatory-type"
procedure and that even though the Attorney General's determination was discretionary, procedural safeguards, enforced by judicial
review, guaranteed fair and consistent treatment of aliens.5 2
To determine the constitutionality of congressional review of the
suspension process, the court applied the test for weighing violations of the separation of powers doctrine. The test defines a constitutional violation as "an assumption by one branch of powers
that are central
to the operation of a coordinate branch, provided also that the assumption disrupts the coordinate branch in
the performance of its duties and is unnecessary to implement a
legitimate policy of the government." ' s The court then proposed

45. H.R. Res. 926, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 40800 (1975).
46. In his discretion, the Attorney General may allow the alien to leave voluntarily and at
his own expense if the alien shows that "he is, and has been, a person of good moral character for at least five years immediately preceeding his application for voluntary departure."
Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (Supp. III 1979).
47. 634 F.2d at 411.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 425-29.
50. Id. at 426. To qualify for a suspension order, a deportee must meet the requirements
of § 244(a) of the INA. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a) (1976).
51. 634 F.2d at 427. The Attorney General, in his discretion, may grant or deny the suspension of deportation. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 244(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)
(1976).
52. 634 F.2d at 429.
53. Id. at 425. The court in Chadha drew the separation of powers test from Nixon v.
Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977). Nixon was one of several "Water-
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three possible functions of the legislative veto: congressional correction of executive or judicial misapplication of the statute; joint
congressional and executive administration of the statute; or retention of legislative authority to define substantive rights under the
law.5 4 After applying the separation of powers test to each of these
functions, the court held the functions constitutionally impermissi55
ble when congressionally assumed through the legislative veto.
Judicial Infringement
If, in adopting the legislative veto provision, Congress meant
to correct misapplications of the statute by the other branches of
government, the court reasoned that Congress violated the separation of powers doctrine by unnecessarily usurping a judicial function." The disruption occurred in two ways. First, Congress disrupted the judiciary's relationship with the petitioner by denying
him articulated reasons and stare decisis in the interpretation of
the INA. With no regard for due process and without following full
statutory procedures, Congress, by assuming the adjudicative function of review, made any judicial review of procedural abuse advisory and subject to congressional reversal.57 Second, by ururping
the essential judicial function of administrative review, Congress
eliminated any meaningful role for the courts in assessing administrative application of the statute.5 8 Basically, courts ought to say
what the law is, while Congress ought to make the law. 9 Finally,
gate"-related cases that considered the separation of powers doctrine. See also United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Siica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973). By
allowing one branch of government to impose on another and rejecting the defense of executive privilege, the courts, in the interest of momentary necessity, may have sabotaged the
separation of powers doctrine. Allowing inter-branch mfrngements because of an "overridmg need" to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress, 433 U.S. at
443, expands an exception to the doctrine that previously had been limited to military pnvilege and state secrets, see United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953), or economic
crisis, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 639 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring). Such vague language may encourage numerous infringements of separation of
powers under the guise of governmental necessity.
54. 634 F.2d at 429.
55. Id. at 429-35.
56. Id. at 429-30.
57. Id. at 430-31.
58. Id. at 431.
59. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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the court deemed this violation of separation of powers unnecessary because the courts were capable of assuring due process and
of properly supervising application of the statute. If Congress disagreed, it could use the constitutional process of statutory
amendment.6 0
Executwe Infnngement
The court also concluded that, if Congress intended to share
the administration of suspensions of deportations, usurpation of an
executive function violated the Constitution.6 1 This infringement
also occurred in two ways. First, the subordination of a fully reviewed executive decision undercut the executive power to carry
out the law in an individual case pursuant to that branch's constitutional mandate. The veto created ambiguity in the statutory
standards to be applied in granting suspensions, and it negated the
effectiveness of long-evolved administrative expertise in making
such determinations, thus causing inefficient administration of the
law. 62 Second, the veto separated the alien from established administrative procedural safeguards and replaced them with the uncertainty of congressional whim.6 3 Again, the court held this infringement unnecessary"
Bicameral Violation
Finally, if Congress proposed to retain legislative authority
over the grant of suspensions of deportation, the court held the
legislative veto unconstitutional for lack of bicameralism. 5 Bicameralism, as applied in the Constitution, is a powerful internal check
on Congress that prevents legislative usurpation of non-legislative
functions.6 6 The court reasoned that the broad necessary and
proper clause of article I of the Constitution was insufficient to
overcome this basic legislative requirement.6 7 Having delegated the
60. 634 F.2d at 431.

61. Id. at 431-32.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 432.
Id.
Id. at 432-33.
Id. at 433-34; see note 23 supra.
See THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (A. Hamilton or J. Madison), supra note 1, at 400.
634 F.2d at 433-34.
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decisionmaking authority to suspend deportation orders, Congress
may not eliminate the right of nondeportation conferred by the executive branch by a legislative device lesser than originally was required to pass the law.68 A single house of Congress cannot exercise
more power than is conferred on the whole body by the
Constitution. 9
Because Congress can form clear deportation and suspension of
deportation criteria for the executive and judicial branches to apply, the court held the legislative veto provision, section 244(a) of
the INA, unconstitutional." If the veto survived, the executive
branch would become "a sort of referee" whose decisions, even after judicial review and approval, could be overturned by Congress.7 1' In addition, the court emphasized that the executive
branch could not execute the laws7 2 because the law in a given case
would remain tentative until Congress acted."
ATKINS V. UNITED STATES

Although the court in Chadha held the one-house veto provision
of the INA unconstitutional, it did not hold that all such legislative
vetoes were invalid.7 4 The Court of Claims, in Atkins v. United
States,7 5 also considered a legislative veto provision and held a
one-house disapproval provision in the Federal Salary Act of
196776 constitutional. Thus, the general validity of the legislative
veto is in dispute pending a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the
matter.7 8 Irreconcilable as Chadha and Atkins seem, however, sev68. Id. at 434-35.
69. See Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 182 (1880).

70. 634 F.2d at 435.
71. Id. at 435-36.
72. See note 29 supra.

73. 634 F.2d at 436.
74. Id. at 433.
75. 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Cl. 1977).
76. Federal Salary Act of 1967, § 225(i)(1)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1976) (amended
1977). Prior to the decision m Atkins Congress removed the one-house veto provision and
replaced it with a veto provision requiring resolution of both houses. See Federal Salary Act
of 1967, Pub. L. No. 95-19, 91 Stat. 45 (1977) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 359 (Supp. MI 1979)).
The court in Atkins held this to be inconsequential to the disposition of the case. 556 F.2d
at 1059 n.16.

77. 556 F.2d at 1070-71.
78. The Reagan Administration has vowed to press the Supreme Court for a definitive
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eral important distinctions exist between the functions and effects
of the veto provisions that the cases involved.
Plaintiffs in Atkins, 140 federal judges, sued the Government to
recover additional compensation they alleged was due them under
the Constitution." The Constitution prohibits dimunition of judicial salaries by either the executive or the legislative branches during a judge's term in office.80 During the period between 1969 and
1975, however, the real dollar value of plaintiffs' salaries decreased
due to inflation."' Pursuant to the Federal Salary Act of 1967, the
President in 1973 recommended a seven and one-half percent annual increase in the salaries of federal judges.2 In accordance with
the one-house disapproval provision of the Act,83 the Senate vetoed
the increase by passing a resolution disapproving the recommendation. 84 Plaintiffs then alleged that the legislative veto unconstitutionally usurped the executive power reserved to the President in
article II, section 1 of the Constitution,85 but the court held that
the veto provision did not violate the separation of powers doctrine
and thus was constitutional. 6
In finding the legislative veto provision constitutional, the court
in Atkins relied on the broad power87 granted Congress by the necessary and proper clause of the Constitution. 8 Further, the court
noted unique aspects of the Federal Salary Act that made the legislative veto provision constitutional. First, article I, section 1 of
the Constitution, which places legislative power in Congress, does
not require affirmative bicameral action every tine a legislative
ruling on the constitutionality of legislative vetoes in the expected appeal of the Chadha

decision to that court. Legislative Vetoes Face Legal Attack, N.Y. Times, March 19, 1981 §
A, at 17, col. 1.
79. 556 F.2d at 1030.
80. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1.
81. 556 F.2d at 1033.

82. Id.
83. The provision provides that "recommendations of the President
shall become
effective
but only to the extent that
neither House of the Congress has enacted

legislation which specifically disapproves all or part of such recommendations.
Salary Act of 1967, § 225(i)(1)(B), 2 U.S.C. § 359(1)(B) (1976) (amended 1977).
84. 556 F.2d at 1033.
0
85. Id. at 1034.
86. Id. at 1070-71.
87. See note 17 supra.
88. 556 F.2d at 1061.

"Federal
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power is exercised.89 Because the matter of salaries is traditionally
within the province of the legislative branch,90 and because the
presidential recommendations affect only those whose salaries are
established by Congress, 1 the court reasoned the legislative action
did not require the affirmative concurrence of both houses.92 Sec-

ond, the President's recommendations have no force of law. Therefore, the one-house veto merely rejects a proposal; the veto does
not alter existing law, but merely preserves the status quo.93 In its
determination, however, the court explicitly limited its ruling to
the question of the constitutionality of the legislative veto provision involved in the case and did not address the broader question
of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes m general.9
COMPARISON OF CHADHA AND ATKINS

The legislative veto provisions challenged m Chadha and Atkins
are distinguishable primarily because the deportation proceeding
affected an adjudicative function of administration, while the salary recommendation affected a rulemaking function.9 5 These separate administrative functions require varying degrees of due process and formality in their procedures. Adjudication requires
stringent due process and formality, whereas rulemaking requires
less stringent due process and permits greater informality.9 Furthermore, rulemaking is a general determination that affects a
broadly identifiable class9 7 and prescribes future conduct.98 Adjudi89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1062.
1063.
1059-60.
1063.

93. Id.
94. Id. at 1059.
95. The procedures required for rulemakmg and adjudication are found in the Admmitrative Procedure Act (APA), §§ 4, 5, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 554 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Deportation proceedings are exempt from the APA. See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S 302, 305-11
(1955). This fact, however, does not affect the application of the adjudication-rulemaking
distinction to Chadha because enactment of the APA merely codified the distinctions between rulemakmg and adjudication. B. SCHWARTZ, ADMNISTRATVE LAW 143-44 (1976).
Thus, the administrative procedure used in deportation proceedings is no less adjudicatory
because of this exemption.
96. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 95, at 143-44.
97. See, e.g., American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 359 F.2d 624, 636 (D.C. Cir.) (Burger, J.,

dissenting), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 843 (1966).
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cation, on the other hand, is a specific determination that affects
particular individuals"9 and determines liabilities and rights based
on present or past facts.100 The administrative determination in
Chadha affected only the alien, Chadha, in an action that required
stringent due process in determining whether to suspend his deportation. The procedure involved clearly was adjudicative. Conversely, the determination in Atkins affected the future salaries of
a broad class of federal employees and clearly was a rulemaking
function.
The importance of the adjudication-rulemaking distinction lies
in the similarity of each of these administrative functions to the
types of legislation containing the legislative veto provisions.
Rulemaking is inherently a legislative function 0 1 and therefore lies
within the scope of the constitutional powers of Congress. Thus, a
legislative veto that supersedes a rulemaking function, such as was
present in Atkins, should have a presumption of constitutionality,
which can be overcome only by showing a serious breach of another branch's constitutional integrity. Adjudication, on the other
hand, is essentially a judicial function 0 2 and therefore does not lie
within the constitutional authority of Congress. Thus, a legislative
veto that reviews an adjudicative function, as did the provision in
Chadha, should carry a presumption of unconstitutionality because Congress infringes upon an essential power of the judicial
branch.
The two cases may be distinguished by the disparate degree of
administrative finality entailed in each of the statutory delegations
of authority. A conclusive administrative decision generally is unappealable and establishes the involved parties' administrative status.103 A decision by the Attorney General on whether to grant suspension of a deportation order has been held administratively
98. See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).

99. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 95, at 144.
100. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908).
101. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 95, at 143.
102. Id.

103. M. FORKOSCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 299 (1956). Although a final determination
generally is unappealable when a rulemakmg decision is involved, judicial review of due
process considerations is not precluded when an individual liberty is denied or altered.
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955).
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final.0 Thus, the administrative decision placed Chadha in a final,
determinative status of nondeportation. 105 The statutory delegation in Atkins, however, entailed no such administrative finality.
Because of the historic and intrinsic congressional interest in federal salary levels1 06 and the apparent congressional intent to reserve to itself final authority to set pay levels, 07 the presidential
salary recommendations were not administratively final until the
statutory time period for congressional action had run.108 Thus, the
delegation of authority in Atkins lacked the force of administrative
finality that was present in the delegation in Chadha. Veto of the
salary recommendation did not alter an administratively conferred
final status, but instead maintained the status quo.
Finally, the two cases are distinguishable because Chadha dealt
with the deprivation of an individual liberty, while Atkins merely
concerned a regulation of a property right. Although suspension of
deportation has been held to be an act of grace and not a right,' 9
the court in Chadha reasoned that Chadha possessed such a
right. 10 Before Congress acted, Chadha occupied the status of a
nondeportable alien."1 ' When Congress altered this administratively final status, Congress deprived Chadha of an established individual liberty that should have been deprived only by an enact11 2
ment made pursuant to the complete legislative process.
Although the judges in Atkins possessed a constitutionally mandated right,113 Congress deprived the judges of a mere property
4

104. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 543 (1950).

105. 634 F.2d at 435.
106. 556 F.2d at 1059.
107. Id. See also Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302, (D.D.C. 1976), vacated sub nom.
Pressler v. Blumenthal, 431 U.S. 169 (1977), a)td, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978).

108. 556 F.2d at 1063.
109. Jay v. Boyd, 351 U.S. 345, 354 (1956). Jay does not apply to Chadha because Jay
concerned a plaintiff who had been denied suspension of deportation, while Chadha had
been granted a suspension under the administrative procedure. Even though the court in
Jay held that deportable aliens have no right to suspension, once the Attorney General
grants suspension of a deportation order, the suspension confers a right on the alien and
Congress evokes a tangible loss when it revokes that right.
110. 634 F.2d at 434-45.
111. Id. at 435.
112. Id. at 434-35.

113. 556 F.2d at 1059-60.
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right, not an individual liberty 114 Courts have held that deprivation of a property right warrants much less due process protection
than deprivation of an individual liberty right.11
The presence of an individual right in Chadha and the lack of
such a right in Atkins closely relates to the distinction between
administrative adjudication and rulemaking.116 The deprivation of
an individual liberty requires stringent due process procedures and
indicates an adjudicatory function. 111 For deprivations of lesser
rights, however, due process requirements are not as strict, thus
indicating a rulemaking function. 18
CONCLUSION

Although the two courts reached facially opposite conclusions,
deeper analysis shows the results to be distinguishable. The reasoning that may be drawn from the cases is not that the legislative
veto is unredeemably unconstitutional, or that a legislative veto is
always a legitimate means to a constitutional end.119 Rather, the
rule that evolves recognizes a gradation of constitutionality based
on the nature of the law to which the veto is attached. A law that
has a rulemaking function lies close to the heart of congressional
power, and thus the veto provision within it will have a strong presumption of validity At this end of the constitutional spectrum
the congressional panacea of the necessary and proper clause generally will sustain a legislative veto provision. Conversely, a law
with an adjudicative function lies far from congressional authority
and near the protective power of the judiciary The legislative veto
in such law must be presumed invalid as infringing upon a function central to the judicial branch. These presumptions are enhanced or diluted according to the degree of administrative finality
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 77 (1936) (Bran-

deis, J., concurring).
116. See notes 95-100 & accompanying text supra.
117. See note 96 & accompanying text supra.
118. Id.
119. Some dissenting opinions dealing with the merits of the legislative veto have argued
forcefully for its total invalidity. See Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642, 681 n.4 (D.C. Cir.) (per
curiam) (en banc) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting), aff'd sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt, 431 U.S.
950 (1977); 556 F.2d at 1075 (Skelton, J., concurring and dissenting).
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delegated by the law and the existence or nonexistence of a deprivation of an individual liberty right.
Because the analysis of constitutionality can be done only on a
case-by-case basis, the generalizations that arise from the Chadha
and Atkins decisions may lose their validity in subsequent litigation of legislative vetoes when different constitutional considerations appear. Thus, because the great majority of legislative veto
provisions are attached to delegations of rulemaking authority, 12 0
the composite rule of Chadha and Atkins would attach a presumption of constitutionality to such legislative vetoes.12 Other factors,
however, weaken this stance. Some legislative vetoes with rulemaking functions infringe on constitutional areas uninvolved in
Chadha and Atkins. These possibly unconstitutional vetoes include impositions on the acknowledged executive power in foreign
affairs12 2 and on some disputed areas of authority between the executive and Congress. 23
Further, legislative vetoes other than the one-house provisions
involved in Chadha and Atkins have distinct constitutional
problems. For example, committee vetoes are considered highly
suspect methods of controlling regulation.1 2 4 Also, concurrent resolution vetoes may be invalid because of the explicit constitutional
requirement that every bill passed by both houses be presented to
the President. 125 Concurrent resolution vetoes may too closely approximate statutory enactments to bypass this essential check.12 6
120. See J. BoLToN, supra note 7, at 1.
121. Although the Reagan Administration is concerned about some legislative vetoes, it
may support vetoes that place congressional control on independent agencies with no direct
responsibility to the President. Legislative Vetoes Face Legal Attack, supra note 78.
122. E.g., Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 903, 22 U.S.C. § 2443(b) (1976) (repealed
1978) (concurrent resolution of both houses disapproving sale of military equipment to foreign governments).
123. E.g., Impoundment Control Act of 1974, § 1013, 31 U.S.C. § 1403(b) (1976) (disapproval by simple one house resolution of president's proposed deferral of authorized funds).
124. See Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 532 n.7 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
Delegating to a committee the power to administer a statute on a case-by-case basis might
lead to a single member of Congress wielding that authority. Such an assumption of power
would violate the established law prohibiting the endowment of executive powers upon a
legislative office. Ginnane, The Control of FederalAdministrationby CongressionalResolutions and Committees, 66 HARv. L. Rlv. 569, 606-07 (1953).
125. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
126. See, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 285-86 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
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Despite these possible variations on the analysis of Chadha and
Atkins, the basic presumptions drawn from the cases remain valid.
Legislative vetoes are neither completely constitutional nor completely unconstitutional. Furthermore, the constitutionality of legislative vetoes depends upon which governmental function the law
to which the veto is attached assumes. Finality of the admmistrative decision involved and the deprivation of a liberty right also are
important determining factors. Because only the courts in Chadha
and Atkins reached the merits of the constitutionality of the legislative veto provisions, the factors that distinguish the cases serve
as important indications for future determinations of the constitutionality of legislative vetoes.
D. B. H.

